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4.1  Introduction 
Brazil has been a central participant in the developing country debt 
experience. In quantitative terms, Brazil’s $1 10 billion debt accounts 
for some 10 percent of the total debt of developing countries.’ In qual- 
itative terms, Brazil’s strategic use of debt in the 1970s and subsequent 
adjustment difficulties in the 1980s epitomize the possibilities and risks 
inherent in reliance on foreign capital inflows. Brazil’s large resource 
transfer to its creditors and low investment rate since 1982 point up 
the medium-term  problem of  sustaining adequate rates of economic 
development faced by other debtors. Finally, Brazil’s evolution from 
diligent conformity to the rules of  the game to its current moratorium 
symbolizes both the continuing precariousness of the present debt re- 
gime and the apparent inability to devise durable solutions. 
Brazil’s experience is distinctive, however, in three dimensions. First, 
a long tradition of inflation, and hence explicit indexing of wages, rents, 
financial assets, and the exchange rate, introduce special problems of 
adjustment to the sequence of balance of payments shocks since 1973. 
Second, Brazil is a continental economy, with limited reliance on trade. 
Export performance, although much improved  relative to earlier pe- 
riods, has remained somewhat erratic; the internal market has exercised 
much greater appeal. Shortage  of foreign exchange  for essential imports 
has always lurked as a potential  constraint to economic expansion. 
Third, there is an imperative for rapid economic growth, which on the 
whole has been satisfied. In the postwar period, Brazil’s trend rate of 
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expansion of over 6 percent is one of the highest for developing coun- 
tries. That standard is a constant source of pressure upon policymakers, 
whether under military or civilian government. Recession is not a per- 
missible option. In combination, these three characteristics  define very 
narrow limits for economic policy. They help to explain both why debt 
has proved so seductive but also difficult to manage, and why return 
to sustained economic growth and reasonable inflation rates is closely 
tied to more adequate treatment of the debt problem. 
4.2  The Debt Strategy of the 1970s 
The first oil shock caught Brazil at the height of its economic “mir- 
acle”: a product growth of 10 percent a year that had prevailed since 
1968. The economy was showing clear signs of overheating, and excess 
demand for imports. As the leading developing country importer of 
petroleum, and one whose  industry  and transport were centered on 
the car and truck industry, the blow was especially severe. To  make 
matters even more delicate, a political transition was in its initial stages, 
for which continuing prosperity was regarded as  a necessary condition. 
These circumstances predisposed Brazil to an adjustment strategy based 
upon high, although slower, rates of growth, and one in which there 
was more reliance upon government-stimulated import substitution in- 
vestment than upon market driven responses to changes in exchange 
rates or relative prices of petroleum. External debt played  a central 
role in that strategy through its financing of increased investment rates 
and of large trade and current account deficits. By permitting gradual 
rather than immediate accommodation, the negative real income effects 
of  the shock could  be postponed and  go unnoticed  in  the midst  of 
continuing growth. 
If there was demand for debt, there was also supply. Brazil was a 
favored and privileged participant in the Eurocurrency market. It had 
started to borrow early, even before the oil shock, and its rapid growth 
and  level  of  industrialization  qualified  the country as highly  credit- 
worthy. The Brazilian economic technocracy was held in high regard, 
and its political stability was not in doubt. 
The strategy succeeded in sustaining high rates of growth: Between 
1973 and 1979 Brazilian product expanded at a rate of 7 percent, well 
above the average for developing country oil importers as a whole. It 
did so, however, at the expense of a very rapid increase in medium- 
and long-term net debt: $5.3 billion at the end of 1972 to $31.6 billion 
at the end of 1978. The 35 percent annual rate of debt growth was also 
well  above the 25  percent for oil  importers. More significantly,  the 
Brazilian net debt-export ratio had almost doubled and was about three 
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Brazil  had  thus become much  more vulnerable  to changes in  the 
international economy as a result of its adjustment style. Import-sub- 
stituting industrialization was itself highly import intensive in its early 
stages, and despite increasing export subsidies, the domestic market 
was clearly the priority. Oil imports continued to expand, while export 
performance  lagged:  Even  though  sales of  industrial  products  in- 
creased, total  export volume  stagnated between  1973 and  1978. Im- 
proved terms of trade were an important factor in helping the trade 
balance through  1977. 
At  the same time,  there were signs of  an accumulating  domestic 
disequilibrium as the ambitious investment plan was followed.  Gov- 
ernment expenditure outran its finance, and monetary accommodation 
was increasingly necessary to sustain direct outlays and mounting in- 
direct incentives.  The level of inflation  had  doubled from its pre-oil 
shock of 20 percent, and only a stop-and-go macropolicy and increasing 
direct controls prevented the situation from getting even more out of 
hand. 
4.3  The Second Oil Shock and Subsequent Adjustment 
Even on the eve of the second oil shock, Brazil faced the need for 
a midterm modification of strategy. Such was the proposal of Mario 
Simonsen, to whom economic policy  had  been entrusted in  the Fi- 
gueiredo government installed in March 1979. He sought to reduce the 
government deficit and to finance less of it through credit. In addition, 
he sought to expand the use of price signals, including more aggressive 
exchange rate devaluation, as well as to accept the more modest rates 
of growth implicit in a stabilization policy. 
This approach, labeled “recessionist”  by Brazilian critics, yielded 
to a more ambitious supply-side plan undertaken by Simonsen’s suc- 
cessor, Antonio Delfim Neto, the author of the earlier “miracle.”  Prior- 
ity was given to expenditure and credit expansion to finance investment 
in the agricultural and energy sectors. A maxi-devaluation of 30 per- 
cent, the first departure from the crawling peg implanted in 1968, would 
ease the foreign exchange constraint. Macroeconomic policy  would 
contain inflation  by reducing interest rates (a significant cost compo- 
nent), and by  changing expectations through  preannounced internal 
monetary correction and exchange rate devaluation at 45 percent and 
40 percent, respectively. 
Heterodoxy did not work this time. The balance of payments, under 
pressure from the oil price increase and a 7 percent product increase, 
registered  a  record  current account deficit  of  $12.4 billion  in  1980. 
Inflation reached a three digit level, reflecting excess demand, the in- 
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sequences of a new wage law mandating a shorter adjustment lag. New 
finance was necessary, adding not only to the registered medium-and 
long-term debt, but increasingly to short-term liabilities. 
The deterioration in  creditworthiness enforced a foreign exchange 
constraint and, in October 1980, a more orthodox package of fiscal and 
monetary restraint was fashioned. Banks then agreed to new loans in 
1981 to meet immediate needs. But the financing, since it was increas- 
ingly allocated to debt service, did not leave a margin for real growth. 
Brazil reluctantly entered into a lengthy period of adjustment through 
recession that was to last until 1983, provoking a decrease in absolute 
income of 4 percent that was greater than the fall in the 1930s. 
The sudden decline in the availability of bank financing for debtors 
in 1982, after the Mexican de facto moratorium in August, was a major 
reason for this poor performance. Coming  just when interest rates were 
rising sharply, and OECD countries were opting for reduced demand 
to control inflation,  the capital  supply  shock left  no alternative but 
contraction. Try as Brazil might in September and October to empha- 
size its continuing creditworthiness, replete with its own austerity pro- 
gram, the application for an IMF extended facility loan immediately 
after the November elections was a foregone conclusion. 
Brazil’s experience under the aegis of the Fund was tumultuous, as 
the submission of seven letters of intent over a two-year period sug- 
gests. There was reason for the two waivers, three modifications  of 
targets, and two suspensions that characterized the relationship. 
First, the initial program retained the limited and unrealistic financing 
requirements that the Brazilian authorities themselves had calculated 
in  their effort to bypass the Fund. Such an underestimate required 
larger domestic financing of the rising interest debt service, and thereby 
made internal targets equally erroneous. Even the reduced  disburse- 
ments agreed upon were not made in a timely fashion, complicating 
the situation more. Noncompliance was self-fulfilling. 
Second, the standard nominal target for public-sector borrowing re- 
quirements, which is the centerpiece of an IMF stabilization program, 
did  not  easily conform to a highly  indexed  economy. The recorded 
increase in nominal government borrowing necessarily accommodated 
to the realized rate of inflation (and the exchange rate for a large part 
of the debt) since the outstanding principal was automatically revalued. 
Higher  than projected  inflation  rates quickly  absorbed all  available 
finance for monetary and exchange correction, suggesting that policies 
were unrealistically stringent. This soon became apparent after another 
maxi-devaluation in February 1983 and led to an amended letter even 
before the first had been considered by the board. By the fourth letter 
in November, the Fund finally accepted the concept of an operational 
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quately measured the management of fiscal policy. This innovation has 
become  characteristic of  arrangements with  other  Latin  American 
countries as well. 
The third reason for agreement changes was that there was a marked 
divergence between internal and external performance. Contrary to the 
IMF model tying the improvement  in the balance of payments to re- 
duction in domestic credit and inflation, the Brazilian external accounts 
improved partially at the expense of higher inflation and larger public- 
sector deficits. Pervasive indexation projected exchange devaluations 
into higher rates of inflation. Export surpluses absorbed domestic sav- 
ing and exerted upward pressure on interest rates that were applied to 
growing  internal  debt. Despite  these interactions, and  the Brazilian 
subordination  of  internal  targets to external  priorities,  the  Fund’s 
preoccupation with inflation and deficits was persistant and became a 
source of continuing friction. 
Brazil’s  trade balance  improved  more rapidly  than  had  been ex- 
pected, due to the jump in exports in  1984. Surpluses of $1 billion a 
month, adequate to meet interest payments, obviated the need for new 
private  capital  inflows  in  1985. This  led  to suspension of  the  IMF 
agreement as well as postponement of the planned multiyear resched- 
uling with the banks. The new civilian government, free from the re- 
quirements of external creditors, soon opted for a more expansionist 
policy based upon increased internal demand. Gross domestic product 
grew more than 8 percent in  1985. 
Accelerating inflation, however, remained a concern and provoked 
popular discontent and political dissatisfaction. The response was the 
Plano Cruzado, in the mold of programs launched within the year in 
Argentina and Israel. It was a bold, and temporarily successful,  attempt 
to match the success that had been achieved on the trade account with 
a recession-free  solution to inflation  that had escalated, by February 
1986, to an annual rate approaching 400 percent. 
4.4  Stopping Inflation 
The basis of the Plano Cruzado was the recognition that indexing 
played a central role in projecting past increases in price into the future: 
pt = a . p,-,  + b  *  gap, + c  *  e, , 
where p  is the rate of inflation, gap is a measure of excess demand, 
and e is an indicator of supply shocks. Past inflation is built into current 
cost through its effect on wages, the exchange rate, and public sector 
prices. Excess demand measures the degree to which cost increases 
will be absorbed, but also the extent to which cost increases can be 
averted, as for example by increased labor turnover to avoid mandated 86  Eliana A. CardosolAlbert Fishlow 
wage increases. Shocks record the effect of independent internal and 
external effects upon prices: harvests, oil prices, devaluation, etc. Where 
such a process has long been operative, as in Brazil, the role of nominal 
demand in stopping inflation is weak relative to the replicative effects 
of  formal indexation. Moreover, any escalation of  prices from supply 
shocks get permanently  embedded in the inflation rate.  Endogenous 
increases in velocity and money supply accommodate increases in prices. 
To  stop inflation effectively under such conditions requires a coor- 
dinated standstill of  wages and prices. Indexing is nothing more than 
an automatic incomes policy to guard against erosion of  real returns. 
The essence of the Cruzado Plan was to substitute a sophisticated price 
and wage freeze, where the latter took into explicit account the stag- 
gered contract period and thus the average level of real earnings over 
the preceding six months. Financial contracts also had to be rewritten 
to account for anticipated inflation in future payments. The new cur- 
rency, which progressively appreciated against the old, facilitated the 
adjustment. 
A neoclassical alternative approach would have consisted of  an an- 
nouncement of  a new and credible noninflationary monetary regime, 
and a simultaneous wage recontracting. In conditions of hyperinflation, 
prices and wages tend to be measured in terms of foreign currency. It 
is not difficult, therefore, simply to rescale and stop inflation flat, as 
long as monetary and fiscal policies assure that the conversion holds. 
In Brazil, short of  that degree of  inflation, the freeze of  the Cruzado 
Plan was a more feasible way of breaking the vicious circle. Nonethe- 
less, it required that other sources of inflation be eliminated. 
As it turned out, however, they were not. After an initial euphoric 
reception, the price freeze instead became the principal and preferred 
instrument of anti-inflationary policy. Politics had much to do with the 
decision. An impending election in November became the critical ho- 
rizon around which all planning was centered. Critical decisions were 
postponed, and those intermediate measures taken to restrain the over- 
heating  economy  were  consciously  diluted.  Remonetization  of  the 
economy to satisfy increased demand for money balances and to pre- 
vent excessive real interest rates had gone too far. Fiscal policy, instead 
of  being neutral, as the authors of the Cruzado Plan had hoped after 
the December tax increases, was expansionary. And wage policy en- 
couraged, rather than restrained, the increases in real wages that had 
been on the rise since the expansion in 1985. 
As shortages developed, expectations of resurgent inflation encour- 
aged speculative accumulation  of  inventory and real  assets, but not 
longer-term investment. Since the exchange rate had  been held con- 
stant, it was becoming overvalued relative to repressed inflation, lead- 
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underwent rapid deterioration in the last quarter of the year, and re- 
serves were drawn down. When new increases in the excise tax (100 
percent on beer and cigarettes  and 80 percent on cars) were finally 
announced immediately after the election, they were too little and too 
late. Efforts to purge the price index, and hence prevent it from influ- 
encing wage demands, encountered popular resistance. Thereafter, de- 
control proceeded irregularly  until  the freeze was formally lifted  in 
February 1987. Unchecked by the force of past, low-inflation inertia, 
prices exploded and were joined by wages triggered by the 20 percent 
annual threshold of the escala move1 (sliding scale) that had been added 
to the Cruzado Plan. Interest rates registered ever increasing inflation- 
ary expectations that became reflected  in actual price increases. The 
finance minister,  Dilson Funaro, had gone from hero to villain in the 
space of six months. Even the proclamation of a moratorium on interest 
payments on the medium- and long-term commercial debt could not 
save his job. 
The Cruzado Plan,  which  had  been so promising,  had  failed  and 
accelerating inflation remained. Its treatment was to require still new 
emergency measures and another freeze put in place by the successor 
finance minister,  Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira. The prospect of more 
conventional stabilization, predicated upon some reduction of real wages 
and slower demand growth, has unleashed a profound debate within 
the majority party, the Partido do Movimento Democratic0 Brasileiro 
(PMDB). Central  to success will  be the ability  to gain control over 
government expenditures, not only of the Federal government but of 
heavily indebted states and municipalities. 
Comparison of the earlier 1964-67  success in reversing accelerating 
inflation  with the failure of the Cruzado Plan  suggests three lessons. 
The first is that it was easier to gain control over the fiscal deficit in 
1965, when  the  inherited  public  debt from  the past  was small  and 
external assistance was  forthcoming. By  contrast, the debt-income 
ratio  in  1986 stood  at 50 percent, and a large  transfer of  resources 
amounting to 4 percent of product was necessary to service external 
interest. 
The second lesson is to avoid excess boldness in policy implemen- 
tation.  The Cruzado Plan  aimed for zero inflation  and abolished  in- 
dexation, while the program of 1964-68  introduced indexing as a way 
of reducing the real misallocations inherent in living with some inflation. 
Indexation is a source of inflation propagation, but it is also protection 
against rapid inflationary acceleration of the kind that occurred in early 
1987. Adjustment triggers without caps and financial assets tied to the 
short-term interest rate created a volatile climate whose end result was 
inflation  that reached  almost 30 percent a month, or twice what had 
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Third, distributionally neutral disinflation is theoretically attractive 
but difficult to manage. Incomes policy is a necessary means of achiev- 
ing coordination and a reduction in inflation, but not sufficient by itself 
to sustain it. In  1964, residual wage repression was the element that 
underwrote continued progress in reducing the rate of inflation. Real 
wages were supposed to be maintained at their previous average, but 
the nominal wage adjustments were based upon prospective inflation 
rates much lower than realized. In 1986, real wages were increasing at 
the expense of profit margins, and provoked shortages, black markets, 
and disordered growth. In this case, it eventually meant that disinflation 
not only was checked, but that further costs were incurred through a 
deterioration in the balance of payments. Neither the 1964 nor the 1986 
program were implemented as planned. 
4.5  External Debt, Budget Deficits, and Inflation 
The budget deficit is central not only to the failure of the Cruzado 
Plan, but to the acceleration of inflation and high real interest rates of 
the 1981  -84  stabilization period. Adding considerably to the compli- 
cation of fiscal policy is the multiplicity of budgetary concepts, ranging 
from inclusion of monetary and exchange correction that is self-financed, 
to a cash-flow measure that excludes the implicit subsidies of the mon- 
etary authorities. We  add another in table 4.1: a deficit measure cor- 
rected for inflation, based upon the real increases in the money stock 
and debt required to finance public sector expenditures. This, like the 
others, is  large  and  above target, and has the added  advantage of 
relating directly to the issue of financing. 
In Brazil, because of its more sophisticated financial market and the 
attempt to comply with monetary targets, increases in debt rather than 
changes in the real monetary base and the inflation tax were used to 
Table 4.1  Different Measures of the Budget Deficit as a Share of GNP 
Increase in  Deficit Corrected  FGVa  BRPSb  Operation& 
Year  Total Debt/GDP  for InflationlGDP  measure/GDP  /GDP  Deficit/GDP 
~________________ 
1982  29.9  8.4  3.7  15.8  6.6 
I983  60.5  15.2  4.1  19.9  3.0 
1984  60.7  4.6  4.7  23.3  2.7 
I985  65.6  6.1  n.a.  27.8  4.3 
Source: Cardoso and Reis (1986), and Banco Central of Brazil, Brad Programa Econ- 
Bmico, February 1987. 
Calculated on cash-flow basis, excludes the monetary authorities’ deficit. 
bBorrowing requirement of the public sector, calculated on  accrual basis, excludes the 
monetary authorities’ deficit. 
“Subtracts monetary correction from BRPS. 89  The Macroeconomics of the  Brazilian External Debt 
finance the  deficit. As external resources  became  more  limited,  in- 
creases in the internal debt were the necessary vehicle. This process 
required ever higher real interest rates, that crowded out private in- 
vestment, provoked in turn higher public interest expenditure and def- 
icits, and pushed up private financial costs. Real devaluation in  1983 
had the effect of  significantly increasing internal debt through an ex- 
change rate-based  revaluation  of  principal greater than the inflation 
rate. 
A simple two equation model incorporating debt finance in an open 
economy and  specifying inflation dynamics brings out  the  essential 
elements of this interaction. The first equation combines the govern- 
ment budget constraint and the balance of payments definition: 
(1)  p = alh - ri 
where p  is the growth rate of  the real monetary base; a is the sum of 
the domestic deficit financed by increases in the monetary base and of 
the net trade and nonfactor service surplus; h is the real monetary base; 
and ri is the rate of inflation. 
The second equation describes changes in inflation as a function of 
excess demand. Inertial inflation is built in. Inflation accelerates when 
the actual real interest rate (i -  T)  corresponding to goods and money 
market equilibrium, is below the full employment real interest rate, Y, 
determined by permanent government expenditure, G, and the net trade 
and nonfactor service surplus, NX: 
(2)  ri  = a[ v(G, NX) - (i - n)] 
Figure 4.1  shows how  Brazilian inflation between  1979 and  1985 
increased despite reductions in the real monetary base. The two equa- 
tions are graphed. Since a reduced monetization of domestic deficits 
offsets the export surplus, the schedule p = 0 is held constant. The 
other, ri = 0, shifts to the left as government expenditure increased 
and larger trade surpluses were necessary to pay interest on the external 
debt. The economy adjusts in  a cyclical fashion; inflation no sooner 
subsides before another increase in excess demand sends both inflation 
and the required real interest rate up again. 
In late  1986 and  1987, the acceleration in  inflation after the failure 
of the Cruzado Plan can also be explained within the context of  the 
same model.  But  now,  with  monetization  of  the  larger  deficit,  the 
p = 0 schedule also shifts, but to the right. The increase in the money 
supply lowers nominal interest rates and stimulates demand, pushing 
up the inflation rate. Gradually, inflation catches up with money growth 
and then exceeds it, reducing real cash balances and increasing the real 
interest rate. There is, therefore, a direct linkage between the growing 
inability to finance the public sector deficit externally after 1979, and 90  Eliana A. CardosolAlbert Fishlow 
p=O 
Fig. 4.1  Successive increases in the full employment real interest rate 
domestic inflationary impulses. The debt problem went much deeper 
than the immediate effects of the balance of payments. 
4.6  Import Substitution and Export Diversification 
From the standpoint of the balance of payments, Brazil was espe- 
cially vulnerable to the oil, interest rate, and debt shocks because of 
its longstanding emphasis on import substitution industrialization. There 
was no margin of substantial competitive imports to be reduced easily. 
Trade was reduced to little more than 5 percent of total gross product. 
In addition, Brazil remained very dependent on imported oil. Import 
substitution  had worked in Brazil, unlike many other countries, because 
of the size of the market; indicators like effective protection typically 
underestimate the competitiveness  of the industrial sector because they 
generalize exaggerated tariffs to all domestic prices. 
By 1964, after more than a decade of grappling with foreign exchange 
constraint, it was clear that trade liberalization  and greater attention 
to exports were necessary. New and sizable incentives were conceded 
to exports of manufactured products principally  through tax rebates 
of various kinds and subsidized credit. In 1968 the exchange rate policy 
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rates that earlier prejudiced export profitability. Performance improved 
markedly after 1968, with export receipts more than doubling by 1972. 
In addition to the diversification into industrial goods, increases in the 
volume and prices of nontraditional primary exports played an impor- 
tant role. These favorable results gained Brazil access to the Eurocur- 
rency market and underwrote the even more rapid growth of imports 
that accompanied the economic “miracle.” 
The surge in the trade deficit in 1974 and continuing imbalance there- 
after brought a resurgence of import controls and the ambitious import 
substitution with debt adjustment strategy described earlier. The ap- 
preciation of the real exchange rate was offset by larger export incen- 
tives  that  provoked  increased  resistance  from  the  industrialized 
countries, particularly the United States. Export performance was ir- 
regular and disappointing over this interval; real growth stagnated be- 
tween  1973  and  1978, and was an important reason for reliance  on 
continuing  debt.  Improved terms  of  trade  averted worse.  Imports 
meanwhile were increasingly made up of oil and its derivatives, which 
went from 10 percent to almost a third of total imports. 
Brazil, in common with other indebted countries, was forced into a 
massive  reduction  of imports after 1981. It did, however,  achieve a 
large rise in exports in  1984, producing trade surpluses of more than 
$12 billion in that year and in the following year. The same pace was 
followed in the first 9 months of 1986 until the Cruzado Plan unravelled. 
These results permitted interest obligations to be paid without resort 
to much new bank  borrowing. They also led some Brazilians to the 
conclusion  that high rates of growth could  be resumed in  the future 
without fear of again encountering an exchange rate constraint. 
Closer analysis of Brazilian import demand and export supply cast 
doubt upon the validity  of  such an inference.  There is  no decisive 
evidence in favor of structural reduction of  import elasticities in the 
1980s.  Higher  rates of  sustained  growth are therefore likely  to en- 
counter much more than proportional import growth, particularly with 
increases in the investment rate. Relative price elasticities are low, on 
the other hand, limiting the impact of  real devaluation. For exports, 
while manufactured products show a more than unitary real price elas- 
ticity, primary products, still more than a third of the total, are less 
sensitive. The influence of industrialized country income is also smaller 
and less reliable for primary products than for manufactured goods. 
The key point, however, is the large and consistently statistically sig- 
nificant influence of capacity utilization upon both import demand and 
export supply. Prosperity rapidly diminishes the trade surplus by aug- 
menting imports and reducing exports. 
The very favorable performance of the 1980s is thus not yet fully 
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levels or its capacity to sustain competitiveness with other exporting 
developing countries. Nor is international trade likely to be the engine 
of growth that it was before the oil shocks. Over the next few years 
projections show a rather slowly growing market with weak commodity 
prices. In order to revive the Brazilian economy, continued efforts to 
stimulate exports are necessary as well as a better international eco- 
nomic climate. 
4.7  Debt and Growth 
The debt problem is not simply one of macroeconomic adjustment, 
straining the balance of payments, and contributing  to fiscal deficits 
and inflation. The debt problem is also a development problem. 
Export surpluses to satisfy external interest obligations that have 
averaged more than 5 percent of gross product since 1984 imply cor- 
respondingly lower rates of investment. The real interest rates needed 
to restore macroeconomic equilibrium crowd out private-sector capital 
formation; they do not reduce consumption. This large decline of in- 
vestment rates and relative constancy of the consumption ratio is wide- 
spread, and Brazil is prototypical. Investment averaged 21.6 percent 
of gross product in  1980-82,  and only 17.7 percent in  1984-86. 
Such investment rates are incompatible with the sustained recovery 
needed to absorb new entrants to the labor force, let alone to assure 
the continuing advances in productivity required to compete success- 
fully in world markets. Only in an expanding economy, moreover, will 
it  be possible  to bring  the public  sector into better balance, and to 
achieve the increases in domestic saving implied by inevitably smaller 
future foreign savings. Durable structural reforms do not emanate from 
either  stop-and-go  macroeconomic policies  or shock treatments  in- 
tended rapidly to restore equilibrium. Only in an expanding economy 
will it be possible to service the debt reliably and continuously. A low- 
growth economic equilibrium in Brazil, especially under welcome tran- 
sition to democracy, translates into a political and social disequilibrium. 
The first obligations to go, as the February moratorium already shows, 
are debt service. 
Analyses that limit their scope to projecting the balance of payments 
are not  only frequently  overoptimistic  about future imports and ex- 
ports, but also miss  the critical  importance of the reverse resource 
transfer burdening  an adequate recovery.  Enormous trade surpluses 
are not in Brazil’s immediate future. Nor should they be. An efficient 
international capital market should be expected to channel larger for- 
eign savings to a country like Brazil that has a demonstrated record of 
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The implication is either larger capital flows or  a reduction in external 
interest payments. Neither seems entirely likely to emerge from simple 
muddling through. The capital inflows required are large, and there is 
little indication  that they will  be forthcoming under present arrange- 
ments. Martin Feldstein’s calculations for Brazilian net borrowing in 
The Economist (27 June 1987) are made to seem eminently reasonable. 
Yet the net annual borrowing of $4 billion needed in the next few years 
is much greater than achieved in any year since 1982. If capital inflows 
had been larger, as  the Baker Plan was supposed to have accomplished, 
then there would have been no moratorium, and very probably, a much 
more successful outcome to the Cruzado Plan. 
Feldstein is correct regarding Brazil’s capacity to absorb more debt 
productively and eventually to outgrow it in a world that was certain. 
Debt-export and debt-product ratios readily  improve if  modest trade 
surpluses are sustained and growth rates approximate the interest rate. 
This is the argument in support of more lending. Even if it were avail- 
able, however, which remains a large question mark, such a course is 
not without peril. The problem is the projected  1987 debt-export ratio 
of 4.7 from which Brazil starts. That leaves Brazil extremely vulnerable 
to changes in  interest  rates,  higher  oil  prices, slower industrialized 
country growth, and domestic policy mistakes. The trouble with mud- 
dling through is that the growth rates of developing countries have been 
the residual adjustment variable  rather than a target to which capital 
flows reliably accommodate. 
The case for some debt relief  is made by market prices that value 
Brazilian debt at a discount of up to 40 percent. Such valuations imply 
an expectation of less than full debt service on outstanding loans. If 
large voluntary lending were available, Brazil would have an incentive 
to do better than predicted  in order to qualify for needed additional 
capital. Since it is not, an alternative solution is to substitute a more 
certain asset, from the World Bank perhaps, yielding less, with the 
difference passed along in lower debt service to Brazil (and other coun- 
tries) in return for policy conditionality. Now that banks have begun 
to adjust more realistically through loan loss reserves and larger cap- 
italization, there is less risk to  the financial system. Now that countries 
have made significant adjustment  to  the shocks  of the last decade, Brazil 
included, there is the possibility of stimulating a return to needed higher 
rates of economic development. 94  Eliana A. CardosolAlbert Fishlow 
Appendix 
Brazilian Economic Performance: 1971-86 
Table 4.2  Real Rates of Growth of Production Year 
Year  Gross Domestic Product  Industry  Agriculture 
1971  12.0  12.0  11.3 
I972  11.1  13.0  4. I 
1973  13.6  16.3  3.6 
1974  9.7  9.2  8.2 
I975  5.4  5.9  4.8 
1976  9.7  12.4  2.9 
1977  5.7  3.9  11.8 
1978  5.0  7.2  -  2.6 
I979  6.4  6.4  5.0 
I980  1.2  7.9  6.3 
1981  ~  1.6  -5.5  6.4 
1982  0.9  0.6  -  2.5 
I983  -  3.2  -  6.8  2.2 
1984  4.5  6.0  3.2 
I985  8.3  9.0  8.8 
1986  8.2 



































































































“December to December of  indicated year. 
hlncludes time deposits and federal government debt. Table 4.4  Balance of Payments and Debt ($ billion) 
~~ 
Imports"  Net  Level 
Year  Exports"  Total  Fuel  Interest  Account  Inflows  Surplus  Reserves  Debt6 

















2.9  3.2  0.4  0.3 
4.0  4.2  0.5  0.4 
6.2  6.2  0.8  0.5 
8.0  12.6  3.0  0.7 
8.7  12.2  3.1  I .5 
10.1  12.4  3.8  1.8 
12.1  12.0  4.1  2.1 
12.7  13.7  4.5  2.7 
15.2  18.1  6.8  4.2 
20.1  23.0  10.2  6.3 
23.3  22.1  11.3  9.2 
20.2  19.4  10.5  11.4 
21.9  15.4  8.6  9.6 
27.0  13.9  7.3  10.2 
25.6  13.2  5.7  9.7 
22.4  12.9  9. I 
-  1.3 
-  1.5 
-  1.7 
-7.1 
-  6.7 
-  6.0 
-4.0 
-  6.0 
-  10.0 
-  12.4 
-11.0 
~  16.3 
-  6.8 
0.0 
-0.3 
1.8  0.5 
3.5  2.4 
3.5  2.2 
6.3  ~  0.9 
5.9  -  1.0 
6.9  1.2 
5.3  6.0 
9.4  3.9 
7.7  -  3.2 
9.7  ~  3.4 
12.8  0.6 
7.9  -8.8 
2.1  ~  5.4 
0.2  0.7 
-  2.7  ~  3.5 
1.7  6.6 
4.2  9.5 
6.4  12.6 
5.3  17.2 
4.0  21.2 
6.5  26.0 
7.3  32.0 
11.9  43.5 
9.7  49.9 
6.9  53.8 
7.5  61.4 
4.0  69.7 
4.6  81.3 
12.0  91.1 
11.6  95.9 
6.8  101.5 
~ 
Source: Conjuncturu Economica, various issues, and Banco Central of Brazil, Monthly Bulletins, various issues. 
"FOB. 
hRegistered;  excludes interbank liabilities and short-term debt. 96  Eliana A. Cardoso/Albert Fishlow 
Table 4.5  Investment and Saving Shares in GDP 1970 -  1985 
Gross Domestic  Non Factor  Net Factor  Net Foreign  Gross 
Investment"/  Current  Payments  Savings/  National 


































-  1.7 
-  1.7 
-  1.2 
-  5.9 
-  4.0 
-  2.4 
-  0.7 
-  1.2 
-  1.9 
-2.1 
-  0.3 




-  0.8 




-  1.4 
-  1.6 
-  1.6 
-  2.2 




-  5.7 


































Sources: Conjuntura Econdmica, various issues, and Banco Central of  Brazil, Monthly 
Bulletins, various issues. 
"Changes in stocks are excluded. 
hExcludes  factor payments. 
'Includes  reinvested profits. Table 4.6  Brazilian Foreign Debt and Reserves ($ billions) 
~  ~~~ 
Medium- and  Short-  Total  Reserves Net of  Ratio of 
Long-Term  Term  Debt  Gross  Liabilities of  Gross Interest  Ratio of 

































































































1 I .608 
6.760 














































Sources; Banco Central of  Brazil and Nogueira Batista (1985). 
(I) Medium- and long-term debt outstanding at the end of  the year. 
(2) Non-registered debt. 
NB = Nogueira Batista’s estimates. 
CB = Central Bank figures. 98  Eliana A. CardosolAlbert Fishlow 
Table 4.7  Real Exchange Rates and Terms of Trade (1977 = 1) 
































































































(I) Ratio of domestic wholesale prices to foreign wholesale prices times exchange rate. 
(2) Ratio of Brazilian export prices of manufactures to export prices of competitors times 
exchange rate. 
(3) Ratio of domestic prices of manufactures to export prices of  manufactures. 
(4) Ratio of domestic construction prices to prices of domestic manufactures. 
(5)Terms of trade:  export prices divided by import prices. 
Note 
I. Selected data relating to Brazilian macroeconomic performance and debt 
are found in the Appendix. 
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